Regulatory data used to identify Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) have gradually become public since 2014. Exploiting this transparency shock, we show that the scoring methodology implemented by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is biased and can create wrong incentives for regulated banks. Using regulatory data for 106 US and international banks, we show that the economic magnitude of the bias turns out to be important as the regulatory capital of some banks is reduced by more than EUR 20 billion or 16% of their Tier 1 capital. The banks that benefit the most from the bias are US global and custodian banks. We then propose a modified methodology that corrects for the bias.
Introduction
SIFIs, the acronym for Systemically Important Financial Institutions, is a palindrome as it reads the same forward and backward. While the way you read it does not matter, the way you rank financial firms is of utmost importance. Under Basel III, only the 30 most risky firms are typically designated as SIFIs and must hold additional regulatory capital. Moreover, the exact position of a firm within the SIFI list also matters as firms are allocated into risk buckets based on their systemic-risk scores. Indeed, being in the fifth risk bucket implies facing an additional 3.5% requirement in regulatory capital compared to 1% in the first risk bucket. Compared to the standard 8% Cooke Ratio in place since the first Basel Accord, the systemic-risk surcharge appears sizable. As a result, dropping from the list or switching across buckets leads to substantial changes in regulatory capital.
The systemic-risk scoring methodology currently implemented by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) is both simple and intuitive (BCBS (2013) and BCBS (2014b) ). It aggregates information about five broad categories of systemic importance: size, interconnectedness, substitutability/financial institution infrastructure, complexity, and cross-jurisdictional activity. In order not to favor any particular facet of systemic risk, the BCBS computes an equally-weighted average of all categories. 1 However, it is well known that such an aggregation process produces scores that are mechanically dominated by the categories that exhibit the highest cross-sectional variability.
When variables are aggregated in absence of any form of standardization, they are effectively weighted by their standard deviation. As a result, the resulting systemic-risk scores, the ranking of banks, and in turn their extra capital charges are driven by a subset of variables only, which seems inconsistent with the original intention to give equal weight to each category.
The BCBS (2013) itself acknowledges that some categories have an abnormally high influence on the value of the systemic-risk scores. On page 6, one can read that: "The Committee has analysed the application of the scoring methodology described above to three years of data supplied by banks. It has found that, relative to the other categories that make up the G-SIB framework, the substitutability category has a greater impact on the assessment of systemic importance than the Committee intended for banks that are dominant in the provision of payment, underwriting and asset custody services."
In practice, there are two ways to correct for this statistical bias. One is to standardize each category prior to aggregation by subtracting the mean of the variable and scaling it by its cross-sectional volatility. Such a standardization, called z-transform, forces each distribution of observations to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one while maintaining the integrity of the banks' unique pattern across categories. This technique has been routinely implemented since the 1970's in research in education to aggregate students' scores and in psychology to combine patients' attributes (see Guilford and Fruchter (1973) and Gardner and Erdle (1984) ). Another way to reduce the level of heterogeneity in the data is to trim outliers by capping some of the categories. Extreme values can either be discarded or set equal to a given percentile, a procedure known as winsorizing. While removing outliers can be seen as an ad hoc way of reducing the influence of the most volatile variables, it does help to alleviate the aforementioned statistical bias. However, central to this method is the choice of the cap: which categories to cap and at which level? When computing extra capital charges for systemic risk, the BCBS implements the latter strategy and applies a 5% cap to the substitutability category of each sample bank and no cap to the other categories.
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence about the distorting effects of capping systemicrisk categories. Using regulatory data for a sample of 106 global banks from 20 countries, we demonstrate that the number of categories actually capped and the ad hoc level of the cap have first-order effects on the list of SIFIs, and in turn on their regulatory capital. We show that slightly changing the capping scheme significantly alters the composition of the risk buckets. For instance, the current situation which consists in capping the substitutability category leads two banks to switch risk buckets and an aggregate change in regulatory capital of more than EUR 17 billion. 2 For some alternative caps considered in our study, the change in aggregate regulatory capital is as high as EUR 137 billion, which represents more than 50% of the extra capital due to systemic-risk regulation.
Alternatively, computing systemic-risk scores using standardized categories does not need any arbitrary choice to be made. This novel approach sometimes identifies the same SIFIs as the current methodology but it allocates them differently across buckets. As a result, both the aggregate level of regulatory capital and the allocation of the capital across firms would differ with respect to the current situation. This paper contributes to the literature on systemic-risk measurement. As shown by Benoit et al. (2016) , there are two main families of systemic-risk measures: those that aggregate low-frequency regulatory data (like the BCBS score) and those that are based on higherfrequency market data on banks' security prices. Four prominent examples of market-data based measures are the Marginal Expected Shortfall and the Systemic Expected Shortfall of Acharya et al. (2016) , the SRISK of Acharya, Engle, and Richardson (2012) and Engle (2016) , and the ∆CoVaR of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) . The key advantage of market-data based measures is that they can easily be implemented, compared, and backtested as their implementation only requires public data. Differently, the empirical performance of the regulatory approach could not be readily assessed because the necessary data were not in the public domain. It is only since 2014 that data have become available for most global banks, although the first SIFI list was published in 2011 using data from year-end 2009. As a result, until very recently, academics were not in a position to conduct any empirical evaluation of this key policy tool.
The contribution of this paper is to show theoretically and empirically that the official methodology to set capital charges for global banks is biased. In particular, the current systemic-risk scoring methodology is not microfounded: it sometimes creates incentives for the most risky banks to increase risk-taking. We also suggest a modification of the methodology to correct the bias and to uniquely identify SIFIs. Our modified scoring technique can readily be used to compute regulatory capital or a systemic-risk tax on the banks that contribute the most to the risk of the financial system. 3 While there remains significant disagreement over the risk indicators to be included in the computation of an ideal systemic-risk score, this particular choice is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the aggregation process proposed here remains valid for any set of risk indicators.
We believe that recognizing the ad-hoc and unstable nature of the regulatory tool currently used to regulate systemic risk should be of general interest. While our analysis is mainly motivated by some statistical arguments, it carries several important economic messages.
First, recent findings in the literature on the real effects of capital requirements suggest that 3 For instance in France, financial institutions with a regulatory capital greater than EUR 500 million must pay a tax of 0.5% of their regulatory capital (http://bofip.impots.gouv.fr/bofip/6632-PGP). Alternatively, such a systemic-risk tax could be based on the systemic-risk score proposed in this paper.
the capital misallocation reported in this paper may also distort the distribution of credit and risk-taking of large banks. Second, we show that the current systemic-risk regulatory framework is likely to lead to poor regulatory efficiency because it distorts incentives to lower systemic risk and fails to fully internalize the negative externalities created by the SIFIs. For instance, banks will have stronger incentives to reduce risk-taking in an area where there is greater cross-sectional variability because such risk indicator will mechanically carry more weight in the final score. Alternatively, a bank has no incentives to reduce risk once the cap is exceeded. Indeed, being at the cap or exceeding it by a large margin results in the same final score.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We discuss in Section 2 the rationale for regulating systemic risk. In Section 3, we present the scoring methodology currently used by banking regulators, explain the origin of its bias, and suggest a way to correct it. In Section 4, we conduct an empirical analysis based on actual regulatory data. We summarize and conclude this paper in Section 5.
Why Regulate Systemic Risk
Equity capital provides loss absorption capacity to banks and protects their creditors. In practice, bankers claim that they maintain a low level of capital, or equivalently a high leverage, to boost their return on equity. 4 However, with little capital, even a small drop in asset value can make the bank insolvent, i.e., can lead to negative equity capital. From the regulator's perspective, an optimal level of capital for the bank may not be socially optimal because of negative externalities due to a bank failure. First, when the deposit insurance premium paid by the banks is not risk-based or fairly priced, banks are tempted to take too much risk. Second, financial institutions connected to the failing bank can be either directly (counterparty risk and cross-holdings) or indirectly (fire sales and other contagion effects) affected by the bank failure. Another concern with low capital ratio is risk shifting. Indeed, having little "skin in the game" can incite banks to increase risk-taking. Furthermore, an aggravating factor is moral hazard as banks shift their risk exposures when the probability of being bailed out by the Government is high.
To increase financial stability and save taxpayers' money, regulators impose minimum capital requirements to banks. Over the years, the level of the regulatory capital has been based on banks' risk exposures to various sources of risk: credit risk (1988), market risk (1996) , and operational risk (2005) . Nowadays, international banking regulation does not only consider financial institutions in isolation but also ties capital requirements to systemic risk.
The rationale for increasing the regulatory capital of the financial institutions that contribute the most to the risk of the system is to force such banks to internalize the costs they inflict on the system and to create incentives for them to reduce such externalities. However, regulators face a complex trade-off between maintaining high capital requirements to improve financial stability and low capital requirements to boost lending to firms and households and promote economic growth.
In practice, regulators need to quantify the contribution of a given bank to the risk of the system. Various econometric techniques are based on the market price of banks' financial securities (see Acharya et al. (2016) , Brownlees and Engle (2016) , and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016)). These bank-level measures are by nature global as they do not specifically target any particular risk channel. Furthermore, they can be computed at a daily frequency and as such are more reactive than risk measures computed from accounting data.
An alternative route is to compute a systemic-risk score for each bank by aggregating various systemic-risk categories. Ideally, these categories should capture the main sources of systemic risk identified in the academic literature, such as (1) systemic risk-taking, or why financial institutions take large risk exposures and why they choose to be exposed to similar risks; (2) contagion between financial institutions, or how losses in one financial institution spillover to other institutions; and (3) amplification mechanisms, or why relatively small shocks can lead to large aggregate impacts (see Benoit et al. (2016) for more details and references). Once the categories are identified, regulators are free to put more weight on some of them depending on the regulators' risk tolerance with respect to a given category.
If regulators have no economic reasons to favor any particular source of systemic risk, they should give equal weight to all categories.
According to the Modigliani-Miller view, the level of capital should have little impact on the bank's cost of capital and lending policy (Admati and Hellwig (2013) ). Alternatively, in presence of information asymmetry and agency costs, raising equity to meet capital requirements is expensive for banks and can force them to cut lending. Various empirical studies show that regulatory capital materially affects loan supply (Behn, Haselmann, and Wachtel (2016) and Jiménez et al. (2015) ) and risk-taking (Becker and Opp (2014) ). As a result, the choices of (1) the categories used to compute the systemic score and of (2) the aggregation process can have real effects. In the eventuality when the scoring methodology is biased towards a subset of categories, both the distributions of credit and risk-taking in the economy can be distorted.
An important feature of a sound systemic-risk regulation is to provide incentives to firms to reduce their systemic-risk contribution. In that context, capping a given category removes such incentives because the firms scoring very high on a capped category have no incentive whatsoever to reduce risk. As an example, consider a bank with a score of 17% on a given category that is capped at 5%. Reducing this category anywhere between 17% and 5% will not reduce the score of the firm. An even more detrimental consequence of capping is that the bank will not be penalized in terms of systemic-risk score if it further increases the level of this category (e.g., to 20%). Capping categories also removes in some states of the world the positive link between the value of any category and the resulting capital surcharge. Beyond the cap, the regulatory tool does not force banks anymore to internalize the externalities they generate.
Finally, another potential pernicious effect of allowing some categories to be capped is making lobbying more likely. Indeed, when capping is an option, banks scoring particularly high on a given category have strong incentives to lobby the regulators and ask them to impose a cap on this particular category; again destroying the incentives for banks to curb excessive risk-taking.
Measuring Systemic Risk

BCBS Methodology
The BCBS methodology is currently based on 12 systemic-risk indicators which are combined into five main systemic-risk categories: size, interconnectedness, substitutability/financial institution infrastructure, complexity, and the cross-jurisdictional activity of the bank (see Panel A in Appendix 1 and BCBS (2014b)).
Maybe the most natural dimension of systemic risk, size, is proxied by the measure of total exposures used in the Basel III leverage ratio (BCBS (2014a)). It corresponds to the sum of the bank's total assets, the gross value of securities financing transactions, credit derivatives and counterparty risk exposures, as well as some off-balance-sheet commitments. The interconnectedness category is made of three indicators: bank's total assets on financial system, its total liabilities to the financial system, and its total amount of securities outstanding.
This category aims to capture the expected impact of the failure of a bank on its business partners. The substitutability category describes the potential difficulties that the bank's customers would face to replace the services provided by a failed bank. The three related indicators are the bank's payment activity, assets under custody held by the bank, and its total underwriting transactions both in debt and equity markets. The complexity category merges three indicators based on over-the-counter derivatives, trading and available-for-sale securities, as well as illiquid and hard-to-value assets, known as Level 3 assets. The greater the bank complexity, the higher the costs and the time needed to resolve a failing bank. Finally, the cross-jurisdictional category combines two indicators on cross-jurisdictional claims and liabilities. The rationale for accounting for cross-jurisdictional activities is that banks with international activities allow shocks to be transmitted throughout the global financial system. Formally, each bank i, for i = 1, ..., N , is characterized by K systemic-risk categories denoted x i1 , ..., x iK . Each category x ij is obtained by aggregating F j indicators (X ijf ) associated with category j, scaled by their sample totals:
The systemic-risk score for bank i, denoted S i , is then defined as a weighted sum of these K categories:
where w j corresponds to the weight (common to all banks) of category j in the systemic-risk score. Note that all x ij , for j = 1, ..., K, have equal means.
In order to give the same importance to each category, the BCBS considers an equally weighted index with w j = 1/K. Under this assumption, an increase of 10% of a given category can be offset by a decrease of 10% of another category. In addition, the BCBS applies a 5%
cap to the substitutability category and no cap to the other categories. Accordingly, the systemic-risk score becomes:
with cap j = 5% for the substitutability category and cap j = 100% for the other categories.
Once the systemic-risk scores of all financial institutions have been computed, those with a score higher than a given threshold are qualified as SIFIs. 5 Then, following a bucketing approach, all SIFIs are allocated into four risk buckets of size 100 and an additional empty bucket (bucket 5) is appended to the top. All banks included in a given bucket face an extra capital charge that is added over and above existing capital requirements. The magnitude of the extra capital charge goes from 1% in bucket 1 to 3.5% in bucket 5.
Computing a systemic-risk score by means of an equally-weighted average (as in Equation 2) becomes problematic when the cross-sectional variances of the categories are different. In such a case, a 10% increase of a given category does not represent the same signal if the factor has a variance of 1 or a variance of 100. One implication of this situation is that the ranking issued from the systemic-risk score will be mainly driven by the most volatile categories (see Appendix 2 for a numerical illustration).
The bias will increase with the cross-sectional variation of any systemic-risk indicator. For instance, between 2000 and 2007, the leverage of many global banks increased dramatically (Adrian and Shin (2010) and Adrian and Shin (2011) ) which could have significantly distorted the distribution of the total exposure indicator across banks. Swings in the distribution of an indicator, and in particular in its volatility, mechanically affect the value of the systemic-risk scores and the resulting regulatory capital allocation.
How to Correct for the Bias
We show in this section how to remove the statistical bias that plagues the current systemicrisk scoring methodology. A simple correction consists in standardizing by their volatility all categories that enter into the definition of the score (see Benoit et al. (2016) ). Note that there is no need to subtract the mean of the x ij as it is equal to 10, 000/N for each category. 6
In that case, the systemic-risk score becomes:
where σ 2 j = V(x ij ) corresponds to the cross-sectional variance of category j. Note that the rest of the formula remains unchanged. In particular the weight of each category is still equal to w j = 1/K.
In order to scale the risk indicators in Equation 4
, the cross-sectional variance of each category needs to be known. This is a realistic assumption as the values of all risk categories are now publicly disclosed. In practice, it would also be feasible to compute the variance of each category on a subset of banks only.
Empirical Analysis
The aim of this empirical analysis is to study the sensitivity of the official systemic-risk scoring methodology with respect to the number and values of the caps using actual regulatory data.
We find that the capping scheme has a first order impact on the ranking of the SIFIs. In contrast, we show that standardization by mean of a z-transform leads to a unique set of SIFIs which can readily be used to set bank-specific capital surcharges for systemic risk or to levy a tax on systemic risk.
Data and the Official SIFI List
We focus on the same two samples of international banks currently used by the BCBS. For each sample bank, we collect the value of the 12 indicators required to compute the five systemic-risk categories as of fiscal year-end 2014. 7 While most of these regulatory data are typically confidential data (e.g., cross-jurisdictional claims, intra-financial system liabilities),
the BCBS now requires all banks with a Basel III leverage ratio exceeding EUR 200 billion, as well as banks that have been classified as a SIFI in the previous year, to publicly disclose the 12 indicators.
7 Most sample banks have their fiscal year-end on December 31 but some sample banks have their fiscal year-end in October 31 (Canada) and in March 31 (Japan and India).
We collect systemic-risk data from three different sources. First, the European Banking Authority website gathers data on leading European banks. Second, the Banking Organization Systemic Risk Report (FR Y-15) includes data from large US bank holding companies to monitor systemic risk as requested by the Dodd-Frank Act. 8 Third, for sample banks outside the EU and the US, we collect regulatory data directly from their individual websites. In total, we obtained all the requested data for 106 sample banks as eight banks do not fully comply with the systemic-risk disclosure requirement yet. 9 In order to compare reporting values expressed in different currencies, we convert all figures in Euro using spot rates as of December 31, 2014.
We start by scaling each bank-level indicator by the sum of this indicator across the 75 banks from the main sample and by displaying their probability distribution in Appendix 4. 10 A key result for this analysis is the fact that the various indicators exhibit strong heterogeneity in terms of volatility. For instance, the volatility for assets under custody (283) is more than three times larger than for securities outstanding (91). Furthermore, we see that all distributions are right-skewed which points to the dominant role played by a handful of global financial institutions. For instance, the market share of some financial institutions is close to 10% on the OTC derivatives market, more than 10% for payments activity, and even more than 15% for assets under custody (with a skewness coefficient of 4.5). We provide more summary statistics in the Panel A of Table 1 as well as Panel B in Appendix 1.
[Insert Table 1] 8 37 banks are currently monitored by the European Banking Authority and their data can be obtained at www.eba.europa.eu. 33 bank holding companies are monitored by the Federal Reserve since their total assets is greater than $50 billion, and their FR Y-15 reports are available at www.ffiec.gov.
9 As of July 2016, the non-complying banks are Australian banks (ANZ, Commonwealth, National Australia Bank, and Westpac) and Brazilian banks (Banco Bradesco, Banco do Brasil, Caixa, and Itaú Unibanco). None of these banks have ever been qualified as SIFI by the BCBS.
10 Denominators are publicly available at http://www.bis.org/bcbs/gsib/denominators.htm.
We then combine the 12 indicators into five systemic-risk categories as described in Equation 1. We display the probability distributions of each category in Figure 1 , along with some summary statistics in the Panel B of Table 1 . Even after data have been aggregated, the distributions of the systemic-risk categories remain skewed (the skewness coefficient of the substitutability category is 3.6) with strong differences in the volatility of the categories.
On average, the interconnectedness (respectively substitutability) category is the most (least) correlated with the other categories as reported in Table 2 .
[Insert Figure 1 and Table 2 ]
We start our empirical analysis by replicating the list of SIFIs published in November 2015 by the FSB. To do so, we implement the official methodology described in Section 3.1.
One of the categories, substitutability, needs to be capped at 5%. As this category includes assets under custody, the cap mainly affects the four largest custodian banks in the world:
JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of New York Mellon, and State Street. As shown in Figure 1 and in the Panel B of Table 1 , winsorizing the highest four values mechanically reduces the volatility of the substitutability category: its standard deviation drops from 183 to 124. As a result, the effect of capping is to reduce the relative importance of the three components of the substitutability indicator, namely payment activity, assets under custody, and underwriting activity. Underweight these vital functions of the financial market may come as a surprise, especially given the fact that there were a major source of concern during the Lehman Brothers crisis (Adrian et al. (2014) ).
Using Equation 3
, we then compute the official systemic-risk scores for all sample banks.
We display the scores in descending order in Figure 2 , and provide the identity and scores of the top 30 banks in Table 3 . Using the cut-off scores provided by the BCBS, we allocate the 30 banks into five risk buckets. 11 Carefully following this step-by-step process allows us to obtain exactly the same list of SIFIs and the same bucket composition as the FSB. However, replicating the official methodology provides us with more information as banks are ranked in descending order and not simply by alphabetical order.
Within each risk bucket, banks are equally-spread and show no sign of bunching below the cut-off values. Systematic bunching would indicate that SIFIs strategically manage the value of some of their indicators to lower their systemic score by one notch, which would allow them to save one or half a percentage point in regulatory capital (i.e., more than EUR 10 billion for the largest SIFIs).
By zooming in on the 130 cut-off value that divides SIFIs and non-SIFIs, we see that a small score difference can have a material impact on the regulatory capital. As shown in Figure 2 , the score of the SIFI with the lowest systemic-risk score is exactly equal to the cut-off (Nordea, rank = 30, and score = 130). The non-SIFI with the highest score lies just below the cut-off (Royal Bank of Canada, rank = 31, and score = 123) whereas the non-SIFI with the second highest score is at safe distance from the cut-off (Commerzbank, rank = 32, and score = 108).
[Insert Figure 2 and 
Why Capping Inputs Leads to an Unstable SIFI List
We compare the lists of SIFIs with and without a cap on the substitutability category in Table   3 . Under the BCBS methodology, winsorizing categories mechanically reduces the score of Morgan Chase is able to reduce its regulatory capital by EUR 12.13 billion, 8.94% of its Tier 1 capital, or 29% of its systemic-risk charge. 12 Similarly, the reduction in capital for Citigroup is 0.5% × 998 = EUR 4.99 billion, 3.63% of its Tier 1 capital, or 20% of its systemic-risk charge. In total, the aggregate reduction is EUR 17.12 billion or 6.6% of the total extra regulatory capital due to the systemic-risk regulation (EUR 259.13 billion).
It is important to recognize that capping the substitutability category of four banks is a special case. One could indeed cap the substitutability category of two banks only, or the complexity category of 10 banks, or alternatively to trim the two highest values for all categories, etc. To see whether the choice made about caps leads to different outcomes, we report in Figure 3 the number of bucket changes (blue line, left axis) and the changes in aggregate regulatory capital (red line, right axis) of changing the number of banks affected by the cap on substitutability from n=0 to n=20. The reference point, indicated by a red dot, represents the current situation (i.e., capping the four highest substitutability values). We clearly see that the type of cap affects radically the composition of the various buckets and, in turn, the allocation of the regulatory capital across banks.
We generalize this analysis by contrasting the no-cap benchmark situation with scenarios in which we cap the n highest values of all five categories and reconstruct the buckets. Results in Figure 4 indicate that capping 20 banks triggers (1) 30 bucket changes and (2) a reduction of regulatory capital close to EUR 140 billion. This corresponds to more than 50% of the total extra regulatory capital due to the systemic-risk regulation.
[Insert Figures 3 and 4] 
Systemic-Risk Scoring with Standardized Categories
We now turn to the computation of the systemic-risk scores based on standardized categories discussed in Section 3.2. As highlighted in Column 6 of Table 3 , systemic-risk scores based on standardized categories identify the exact same top 30 banks as the FSB. 13 In Figure 5 , we display all scores based on standardized categories in descending order. 
Robustness Check
We replicate the analysis conducted for the year 2015 using data for the year 2014 (i.e., fiscal year-end 2013). As fewer banks have disclosed their data for this year, we end up with a crosssection of 97 banks only, instead of 106 banks in the main analysis. We display in Appendix 5 the top 30 banks based on their systemic-risk scores with a 5% cap on substitutability. 
Conclusion
Within less than ten years, the systemic-risk area has evolved from an underexplored, mainly theoretical field of academic research into a high-priority regulatory issue. Actively regulating systemic risk requires policy tools such as the bank-level score studied in this paper.
Using novel data on various facets of systemic risk, we show that the official methodology currently used to identify SIFIs and compute their regulatory capital is biased. The current scoring methodology is shown to distort incentives for regulated banks to lower systemic risk and to fully internalize the negative externalities created by the SIFIs. For instance, banks capital). 15 We keep Nordea and BBVA in the SIFI list because we follow the supervisory judgement of the FSB.
have stronger incentives to reduce risk-taking in an area where there is greater cross-sectional variability because such risk indicator mechanically carries more weight in the final score.
Alternatively, a bank has no incentives to reduce risk once the cap is exceeded. We show that the documented bias (1) leads to a severe misallocation of capital among banks (up to 16%
of some banks' Tier 1 capital) and (2) is easy to fix.
Overall, our study points toward the importance of having regulatory tools that are microfounded and create incentives for regulated banks to reduce their contribution to the risk of the system. It also calls for more regulatory data to be publicly disclosed in order to allow academic researchers to backtest regulatory tools. Making systemic-risk regulation more transparent would enrich the regulatory debate and ultimately improve financial stability.
While the focus in this paper is on banking regulation, our findings also resonate with the current debate on the regulation of systemic risk in the insurance industry and the asset management industry (Wall Street Journal (2016) ). Indeed, the current process for identifying systemically-important insurance companies or asset managers is very much inspired by the one developed for banks and, as such, shares some of its shortcomings. The six histograms show the category score distributions of the 106 sample banks' size, interconnectedness, substitutability, substitutability capped at 5%, complexity, and cross-jurisdictional activity, respectively. This figure reports the number of bucket changes (blue line, left y-axis) and its equivalent amount in EUR billion of changes in aggregate regulatory capital (red line, right y-axis) when the number of banks simultaneously affected by caps on size, interconnectedness, substitutability, complexity, and cross-jurisdictional activity gradually changes from 0 to 20 compared to a benchmark situation in which no bank is capped. 
Appendix 2 Numerical Illustration
We illustrate the fact that any ranking based on raw (non-standardized) data is driven by the most volatile categories. Let us assume that the K categories are independently distributed with a common mean but have different cross-sectional variances. We assume that the categories are generated by: ) and category j. The average rank correlations are based on 1,000 simulations. We can verify that the correlation increases with the variance of the category: the higher the volatility of the category, the more similar are the rankings based on the score and the category. 16 The fact that the systemic-risk scores are distorted by the most volatile categories comes in violation of the BCBS's intention to give all categories equal weights. The high sensitivity of the scores with respect to volatility seems to be an unintended consequence of the current methodology.
Panel B of Figure A1 displays the corresponding average rank correlations between the rankings based on the modified score S i and category j. As expected, the suggested correction 16 We obtain similar results when we allow the K categories to have different means (βj).
guarantees that each category contributes equally to the systemic-risk score as desired by the BCBS. Figure A1 : Correlation between score-based rankings and category-based rankings Panel A (respectively Panel B) displays the Spearman average rank correlation coefficient measured between the ranking based on systemic-risk scores with raw (standardized) categories and category j, j = 1, ..., 5. Average rank correlations are based on 1,000 simulations.
